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The evolution of misbelief
Abstract
From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs
maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true
beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken
beliefs, bizarre delusions and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We
begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a
breakdown in the normal functioning of the belief formation system (e.g. delusions) and those arising in
the normal course of that system's operations (e.g. beliefs based on incomplete or inaccurate
information). The former are instances of biological dysfunction or pathology, reflecting “culpable”
limitations of evolutionary design. Although the latter category includes undesirable (but tolerable)
by-products of “forgivably” limited design, our quarry is a contentious subclass of this category:
misbeliefs best conceived as design features. Such misbeliefs, unlike occasional lucky falsehoods,
would have been systematically adaptive in the evolutionary past. Such misbeliefs, furthermore, would
not be reducible to judicious - but doxasticallyi noncommittal - action policies. Finally, such misbeliefs
would have been adaptive in themselves, constituting more than mere byproducts of adaptively biased
misbelief-producing systems. We explore a range of potential candidates for evolved misbelief, and
conclude that, of those surveyed, only positive illusions meet our criteria.
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SHORT ABSTRACT 
 
A default presumption is that whereas true beliefs are biologically adaptive, misbeliefs 
are maladaptive. How, then, can we account for routine instances of misbelief? We 
endorse a distinction between two general types: those resulting from a breakdown in the 
normal functioning of the belief formation system (“doxastic dysfunction”) and those 
arising in the normal course of that system’s operations. We argue that a subset of the 
latter  - positive illusions - arise not incidentally but, rather, systematically, because such 
misbeliefs (the misbeliefs themselves, not just the systems that produce them) are 
adaptive. We are thus evolutionarily predisposed to form such misbeliefs. 
 
 
 
LONG ABSTRACT 
 
From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive 
and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the 
world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to 
this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions and instances of 
self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a 
distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in 
the normal functioning of the belief formation system (e.g. delusions) and those arising in 
the normal course of that system’s operations (e.g. beliefs based on incomplete or 
inaccurate information). The former are instances of biological dysfunction or pathology, 
reflecting “culpable” limitations of evolutionary design. Although the latter category 
includes undesirable (but tolerable) by-products of “forgivably” limited design, our 
quarry is a contentious subclass of this category: misbeliefs best conceived as design 
features. Such misbeliefs, unlike occasional lucky falsehoods, would have been 
systematically adaptive in the evolutionary past. Such misbeliefs, furthermore, would not 
be reducible to judicious – but doxasticallyi noncommittal - action policies. Finally, such 
misbeliefs would have been adaptive in themselves, constituting more than mere by-
products of adaptively biased misbelief-producing systems. We explore a range of 
potential candidates for evolved misbelief, and conclude that, of those surveyed, only 
positive illusions meet our criteria. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Adaptive, Belief, Delusions, Design, Evolution, Misbelief, Positive illusions, 
Religion, Self-deception. 
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1. Introduction 
A misbelief is simply a false belief, or at least a belief that is not correct in all particulars. 
We can see this metaphorically: If truth is a kind of target that we launch our beliefs at, 
then misbeliefs are to some extent wide of the mark. Of course, there is no philosophical 
consensus about just what a belief actually is. In what follows we intend to avoid this 
question, but we offer here the following working definition of belief, general enough to 
cover most representationalist and dispositional accounts: A belief is a functional state of 
an organism that implements or embodies that organism’s endorsement of a particular 
state of affairs as actual.ii A misbelief, then, is a belief that to some degree departs from 
actuality, i.e. it is a functional state endorsing a particular state of affairs that happens not 
to obtain. 
 
A prevailing assumption is that beliefs that maximise the survival of the believer will be 
those that best approximate reality (Dennett, 1971, 1987; Fodor, 1983, 1986; Millikan, 
1984a, 1984b, 1993). Humans are thus assumed to have been biologically engineered to 
form true beliefs – by evolution. On this assumption, our beliefs about the world (about 
what is or isn’t true) are essentially tools that enable us to act effectively in the world. 
Moreover, to be reliable, such tools must be produced in us (it is assumed) by systems 
designed (by evolution) to be truth aiming, and hence (barring miracles) these systems 
must be designed to generate grounded beliefs (a system for generating ungrounded but 
mostly true beliefs would be an oracle, as impossible as a perpetual motion machine). 
Grounded beliefs are simply beliefs that are (appropriately) founded on evidence and 
existing beliefs; Bayes’ theorem (Bayes, 1763) specifies the optimal procedure for 
revising prior beliefs in the light of new evidence (assuming that veridical belief is the 
goal, and given unlimited time and computational resources; see Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996). Of course, just as we can have good grounds for believing propositions that turn 
out to be false, so can ungrounded beliefs be serendipitously true (others arguably lack 
truth values). To keep our exposition manageable, we will not consider such ungrounded 
beliefs to be misbeliefs, although we acknowledge that false and (serendipitously) true 
ungrounded beliefs (and perhaps those lacking truth values) may well be produced in 
much the same way – and by much the same types of mechanism (we return to this issue 
in section 14). 
 
If evolution has designed us to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, 
how are we to account for the routine exceptions to this rule - instances of misbelief? 
Most of us at times believe propositions that end up being disproved, many of us produce 
beliefs that others consider obviously false to begin with, and some of us form beliefs that 
are not just manifestly but bizarrely false. How can this be? Are all these misbeliefs just 
accidents, instances of pathology or breakdown, or at best undesirable (but tolerable) by-
products? Might some of them, contra the default presumption, be adaptive in and of 
themselves?iii 
 
Before we can answer that, we must develop a tentative taxonomy of misbelief. We begin 
with a distinction between two general types: those that result from some kind of break in 
the normal functioning of the belief formation system and those that arise in the normal 
course of that system’s operations. We take this to represent the orthodox (albeit 
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unarticulated) view of misbelief. Part and parcel of this orthodox view is that irrespective 
of whether misbeliefs arise out of the normal or abnormal operation of the belief 
formation system, the misbeliefs themselves are maladaptive.  
 
Our aim in this paper is to evaluate this claim. We will proceed by a process of 
elimination, considering and disqualifying various candidates until we arrive at what we 
argue are bona fide instances of adaptive misbelief. Some candidates will prove not to be 
directly adaptive, the falsity of others will not be obvious, and still others will be rejected 
on the grounds that they are not, in fact, beliefs. The process will highlight the 
theoretically important differences between the phenomena, which are interesting in their 
own right, and will clarify the hypothesis defended – that a subset of the misbeliefs that 
arise in the normal course of belief formation system operations are, in and of 
themselves, adaptive. But first we need to refine the distinction between abnormal 
functioning and normal functioning, as ambiguity on this topic has bedevilled the 
literature. 
 
2. Manufacture and malfunction 
First consider the domain of systems designed and manufactured by humans. Here we 
envisage the distinction as one (codified in warranty legislation) between “culpable 
design limitations” (=malfunctions) and “forgivable design limitations/features”. When a 
given artifact fails to perform a particular task, this failure is always due to a limitation in 
the design of that artifact. The question is whether the design limitation concerned is – 
from the designer’s perspective – a blameworthy, “culpable” limitation (a design flaw, or 
perhaps a flaw in the execution of the design), or whether it is a tolerable, “forgivable” 
limitation. Examples of the former (with respect to the arbitrary task of “keeping time”) 
include: 
 
1) My $20,000 Bolex watch loses ten seconds every day (contra the advertisement). 
2) My cheap Schmasio watch loses ten minutes every day (contra the advertisement). 
 
Examples of the latter limitation include: 
 
3) My toaster does not keep time at all. 
4) My Bolex loses a second every day (within warranted limits). 
5) My cheap Schmasio loses a minute every day (within warranted limits). 
6) After putting it in a very hot oven for an hour, my Bolex does not keep time at all. 
 
What we can see from these examples is that manufactured artifacts either work as 
intended (within a tolerable margin of error), or they don’t work as intended (falling 
outside the tolerable margin). What’s important is not how well the artifacts objectively 
work, but how well they work relative to how they were intended to work (and the 
intentions of the manufacturer will bear upon the advertised claims of the manufacturer). 
The Bolex and Schmasio examples reflect this, because the malfunctioning Bolex still 
works objectively better than the properly functioning Schmasio. 
 
Of course, some apparent design limitations are in fact deliberate design features. To cite 
a single example, contemporary consumers are frequently frustrated by DVD region code 
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restrictions. The fact that a region 1 DVD player (sold in North America) cannot play 
discs sold in Europe or Japan (region 2) is certainly (from the consumer’s perspective at 
leastiv) a limitation in the design of that DVD player – and often a frustrating limitation. 
In our terminology, however, the limitation is forgivable because such players are not 
designed to play DVDs from other regions, and indeed are deliberately designed not to do 
so. Region restrictions are, as software designers often say, “not a bug but a feature” of 
such machines, ostensibly to safeguard copyright and film distribution rights. 
 
The essential lesson is that a manufactured artifact functions properly if it functions as its 
designer intended (and warranted) it to function, under the conditions in which it was 
intended (and warranted) to function. If the artifact fails to function under those 
conditions, then it has malfunctioned, which may be due to a flaw in the design or to a 
flaw in the execution of the design. Here “malfunction” is equated with “culpable design 
limitation” and is defined so as to exclude seeming breaks in function that occur outside 
the constraints specified by the manufacturer (i.e. if a watch falls to pieces a day after the 
warranty expires, this is not a malfunction – not on our definition of malfunction, anyway 
– but a forgivable limitation). 
 
Consider another example: Imagine a computer that is equipped with software for solving 
physics problems. The computer takes the problems as input, and produces purported 
solutions to the problems as output. Suppose, further, that the program that the computer 
implements when solving the problems utilizes Newtonian physics. Consider then three 
different possible scenarios: 
 
1) The computer is assigned a problem about an apple falling from a tree on Earth. It produces the 
correct solution. 
2) The computer is assigned a problem about an apple falling from a tree on Earth. Unfortunately, a 
low-level glitch occurs (a flaw in the execution of the program’s design), causing the program to 
malfunction and to produce an incorrect solution.  
3) The computer is assigned a problem about the mass of an apple as it approaches the speed of light. 
The program runs smoothly and predictably, but arrives at an incorrect solution. 
 
Do the second and third scenarios here map onto the distinction between culpable and 
forgivable design limitations? Whether this is the case depends on the precise intentions 
of the program designer. If the designer had implemented a Newtonian program because 
it was easier and cheaper to do so, but was fully aware that Einsteinian problems would 
compute incorrectly, then the third limitation is forgivable, if it was so advertised. If, 
however, the designer intended his or her program to solve physics problems of all types, 
then this limitation is culpable (and constitutes a “malfunction”, in this rather peculiar 
sense of the word). 
 
Even such a common artifact as an electronic hand calculator produces output that may 
appear culpable: 
 
For instance, arithmetic tells us that 10 divided by 3 multiplied by 3 is 10, but hand calculators 
will tell you that it is 9.999999, owing to round-off or truncation error, a shortcoming the 
designers have decided to live with, even though such errors are extremely destructive under many 
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conditions in larger systems that do not have the benefit of human observer/users (or very smart 
homunculi!) to notice and correct them. (Dennett, 1998, p. 315) 
 
A manufactured object (or feature thereof) works as a model of adaptive misbelief if: 1) 
The object is a specific focus of deliberate design (not a mistake or a by-product); 2) The 
object appears, from a certain perspective, to be malfunctioning or limited insofar as it 
misrepresents information to the consumer of that information; and 3) Such 
misrepresentation is actually beneficial to the consumer of that information. None of the 
cases of artifacts considered thus far would qualify as analogues of adaptive misbelief 
under these criteria, but here is one case that gets close: the automotive mirror that is 
designed such that objects appear farther away than they really are. That this is 
misrepresentation is made clear by the appended cautionary subtitle (required, no doubt, 
by the manufacturer’s lawyers): “OBJECTS IN MIRROR ARE CLOSER THAN THEY APPEAR.” 
The trade-off in the goal of this design is clear: to provide a wider field of view than a 
“veridical” mirror, which is deemed a benefit that outweighs the distortion, a cost that is 
diminished, presumably, by the attached warning. The reason this example ultimately 
fails as a model of adaptive misbelief is that the misrepresentation itself is not the specific 
focus of design, nor is it (in and of itself) beneficial to the consumer; rather, the 
misrepresentation is an unavoidable by-product of producing a wider field of view. 
 
We don’t know of other good candidates but can describe a possible device with a similar 
design rationale: an alarm clock designed to set itself ten minutes ahead in the middle of 
the night (and then to repair its “error” later in the day). Its design rationale would be to 
give its owner a little extra time to get going, but once the user figured this out, the device 
would of course lose effectiveness - a case of “the boy who cried wolf”, a design 
complication that we will discuss in some detail below. Before we move on, we note that 
whereas artifacts designed to misrepresent information to their consumers may not 
exactly be thick on the ground,v there are certainly artifacts – such as shear pins and fuses 
- that are designed to break. In due course we will consider whether cognitive systems 
have evolved any parallel. 
 
3. Evolutionary design and dysfunction 
Commercial disputes notwithstanding, the distinction between abnormal and normal 
functioning seems intuitive enough in the case of systems designed and manufactured by 
humans. How neatly, however, does this distinction carve nature at the joints? Is it 
equally clear for evolved, biological systems? In such cases, our criterion for determining 
malfunction (the disparity between actual functioning and intended functioning) would 
seem invalid, because (unlike the good people at Bolex) evolution is a blind watchmaker 
(Dawkins, 1986), without intentions. What we would like here is some way of making a 
distinction that is equivalent to the distinction between culpable design limitations and 
forgivable design limitations/features. Whereas culpable misdesign in manufactured 
items is the essence of artifactual malfunction, the evolutionary equivalent would be the 
marker of biological dysfunction.  
 
Consider the human immune system. What would count as an example of immune 
system dysfunction? Presumably if the immune system were to succumb to a run-of-the-
mill pathogen, we could speak uncontroversially of immune dysfunction. In some 
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instances, however, the immune system “errs” in attempting to defend the body. Thus one 
of the main problems in organ transplants is that the immune system tries to protect the 
body against foreign matter, even a new heart that would ensure its survival. Is the 
activity of the immune system in the latter case strictly in accordance with its normal 
function? Perhaps that depends on what function we choose to impose upon the system. 
Insofar as the system functions to attack foreign matter, it has performed well. Insofar as 
the system is construed with the more general function of safeguarding the health of the 
body, however, it becomes less clear whether it has functioned normally – and this is the 
problem of evolutionary intentions-by-proxy.vi Is all functionality just in the eye of the 
beholder? Millikan (1984a, 1993) proposes a more objective solution to this problem: 
 
Associated with each of the proper functions that an organ or system has is a Normal explanation 
for performance of this function, which tells how that organ or system… historically managed to 
perform that function. (1993, p. 243) 
 
According to Millikan, in order to determine the function of an organ or system we 
should consider not its present properties, powers and dispositions, but should instead 
take into account its history.vii Given that organ transplants have not featured in the 
evolutionary history of immune systems, any contemporary immune system that attacks a 
donor heart is functioning in accordance with the adaptive functioning of immune 
systems historically. That system, therefore, is functioning normally – or more precisely, 
Normally (see below) – and its limitations are “forgivable”. 
 
Let us consider a further parallel with our proposed misbelief taxonomy, this time by 
examining two types of misperception. Those of us who are short sighted perceive 
(without our corrective lenses) a somewhat distorted visual world. Due to a kind of 
breakdown or degeneration, our visual systems (broadly construed) misrepresent the facts 
– they cease to function properly. Consider, on the other hand, what happens when we – 
with eyeglasses at the ready - submerge a perfectly straight stick into a pool of water. Do 
we continue to perceive the stick as straight and unbroken? No – our visual systems fail 
to compensate for the optical effect of refraction (they do not compute and correct for 
Snell’s law; Boden, 1984; Casperson, 1999),viii and the stick appears bent at the point 
where it meets the surface of the water. Our visual systems have again furnished us with 
misinformation, yet this time they have functioned Normally. The capital “N” here 
denotes a normative, rather than statistical, construal of “normal” (Millikan, 1984a, 
1993).  
 
This is important because although our two examples of visual misperception (the short-
sighted case and the stick-in-water case) can be distinguished on normative grounds (the 
first – being a case of visual dysfunction - is abNormal and the second Normal), they may 
both be normal on statistical (“small-n”) grounds. After all, the prevalence of myopia 
varies across ethnic groups, and is as high as 70-90% in some Asian populations (Chow, 
Dhillon, Chew, & Chew, 1990; Wong et al., 2000). Millikan (1993), however, dismisses 
statistical construals of “normal” functioning. In a vivid example she points out that the 
proper function of sperm is to fertilise an ovum, notwithstanding the fact that, statistically 
speaking, it is exceedingly unlikely that any individual sperm will successfully perform 
that function (Millikan, 1984a). Proper, Normal functioning, therefore, is not what 
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happens always or even on the average; sometimes it is positively rare. Unless otherwise 
indicated, our subsequent usage of “normal” will follow Millikan’s capitalised, normative 
sense. 
 
Now, back to beliefs and misbeliefs. We contend that all instances of misbelief can be 
roughly classified as the output of either a dysfunctional, abnormal belief formation 
system or of a properly functioning, normal belief formation system. The former 
category, to which we turn briefly now, would not include adaptive misbeliefs (although 
see section 10 below), but provides a necessary background for understanding the better 
candidates – which, if they exist, will form a subset (design features) of the latter 
category. 
 
4. Doxastic dysfunction 
In the first category, misbeliefs result from breakdowns in the machinery of belief 
formation. If we conceive of the belief formation system as an information processing 
system that takes certain inputs (e.g. perceptual inputs) and (via manipulations of these 
inputs) produces certain outputs (beliefs, e.g. beliefs about the environment that the 
perceptual apparatus is directed upon), then these misbeliefs arise from dysfunction in the 
system – doxastic dysfunction. Such misbeliefs are the faulty output of a disordered, 
defective, abnormal cognitive system. 
 
This view of misbelief is prominently exemplified by a branch of cognitive psychology 
known as cognitive neuropsychiatry (David & Halligan, 1996). Cognitive 
neuropsychiatrists apply the logic of cognitive neuropsychology, which investigates 
disordered cognition in order to learn more about normal cognition, to disorders of high-
level cognition such as delusions (Coltheart, 2002; Ellis & Young, 1988). 
Notwithstanding objections to the so-called “doxastic conception” of delusions (see 
Section 9), delusions are misbeliefs par excellence - false beliefs that are held with strong 
conviction regardless of counter-evidence and despite the efforts of others to dissuade the 
deluded individual (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). They are first-rank 
symptoms of schizophrenia and prominent features of numerous other psychiatric and 
neurological conditions. Thematically speaking, delusions range from the bizarre and 
exotic (e.g. “I am the Emperor of Antarctica”; see David, 1999) to the more mundane and 
ordinary (e.g. “My husband is cheating on me”). Researchers in cognitive 
neuropsychiatry aim to develop a model of the processes involved in normal belief 
generation and evaluation, and to explain delusions in terms of damage to one or more of 
these processes. 
 
To illustrate the cognitive neuropsychiatric approach to delusion, consider the case of 
“mirrored-self misidentification”. Patients with this rare delusion misidentify their own 
reflected image, and may come to believe that a stranger is following them around. 
Breen, Caine and Coltheart (2001) investigated two cases of this delusion and uncovered 
two apparent routes to its development. The delusion of the first patient (“FE”) appeared 
to be underpinned by anomalous face perception (“prosopagnosia”), as he demonstrated a 
marked deficit in face processing on neuropsychological tests. In contrast, the face 
processing of the second patient (“TH”) was intact. This patient, however, appeared to be 
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“mirror agnosic” (Ramachandran, Altschuler, & Hillyer, 1997), in that he evinced an 
impaired appreciation of mirror spatial relations and was unable to interact appropriately 
with mirrors. His delusion appeared to be underpinned by anomalous processing not of 
faces, but of reflected space (see Breen, Caine, Coltheart, Hendy and Roberts, 2000, for 
transcripts of interviews with the two patients; see Feinberg, 2001, and Feinberg & 
Shapiro, 1989, for descriptions of related cases). 
 
An important question arising at this point is the question of whether prosopagnosia (or 
mirror agnosia) is a sufficient condition for the mirror delusion. The answer to this 
question is almost certainly No. Other cases of mirror agnosia have been reported without 
any accompanying misidentification syndrome (Binkofski, Buccino, Dohle, Seitz & 
Freund, 1999), and non-delusional prosopagnosia is quite common. Breen, Caine and 
Coltheart (2001) thus proposed that the delusion of mirrored-self misidentification results 
from the conjunction of two cognitive deficits, the first of which gives rise to some 
anomalous perceptual data (data concerning either faces or reflected space), and the 
second of which allows the individual to accept a highly implausible hypothesis 
explaining these data. The first deficit accounts for the content of the delusion (the fact 
that it concerns a stranger in the mirror), while the second deficit accounts for why the 
stranger-in-the-mirror belief, once generated, is then adopted and maintained in the 
absence of appropriate evidence for that hypothesis. These deficits constitute breakdowns 
in the belief formation system, presumably underpinned by neuroanatomical or 
neurophysiological abnormalities. In both of the cases investigated by Breen et al. (2001), 
the mirror delusion occurred in the context of a progressive dementing illness. 
 
Coltheart and colleagues (Coltheart, Menzies & Sutton, forthcoming; Davies & Coltheart, 
2000; Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, & Breen, 2001; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; McKay, 
Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007a, 2009) have suggested that a generalised framework of two 
concurrent cognitive deficits, or factors, might be used to explain delusions of many 
different types. In general, the first factor (Factor-1) is some endogenously generated 
abnormal data to which the individual is exposed. In addition to mirrored-self 
misidentification, Factors-1 have been identified or hypothesised that plausibly account 
for the content of delusions such as thought insertion, Capgras delusion (the belief that a 
loved one has been replaced by an impostor) and Cotard delusion (the belief that one is 
dead).  
 
The second factor (Factor-2), on the other hand, can be characterised as a dysfunctional 
departure from Bayesian belief revision (Coltheart, Menzies & Sutton, forthcoming), a 
departure that affects how beliefs are revised in the light of the abnormal Factor-1 data. 
Bayes’ theorem is in a sense a prescription for navigating a course between excessive 
tendencies toward “observational adequacy” (whereby new data is over-accommodated) 
and “doxastic conservatism” (whereby existing beliefs are over-weighted) (Stone & 
Young, 1997). McKay, Langdon and Coltheart (2009) have suggested that whereas some 
delusions – for example, mirrored-self misidentification - might involve the former 
tendency (see Stone and Young, 1997; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; Langdon, Cooper, 
Connaughton, & Martin, 2006; also see Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988), others – for 
example, delusional denial of paralysis (“anosognosia”) - might involve the latter (see 
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Ramachandran, 1994a,b; 1995; 1996a,b; Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998). In general, 
therefore, Factor-2 might be thought of as an acquired or congenital anomaly yielding 
one of two dysfunctional doxastic biases – a bias toward observational adequacy or 
toward doxastic conservatism. 
 
The fact that we are not presently equipped with fail-safe belief-formation systems does 
not tell against an evolutionary perspective. This is because evolution does not 
necessarily produce optimally designed systems (Dawkins, 1982; Stich, 1990) and in fact 
often conspicuously fails to do so. It would be panglossian to think otherwise (Gould & 
Lewontin, 1979; Voltaire, 1759/1962): 
 
Brilliant as the design of the eye is, it betrays its origin with a tell-tale flaw: the retina is inside 
out… No intelligent designer would put such a clumsy arrangement in a camcorder. (Dennett, 
2005, p. 11) 
 
Evolutionary explorations in Design Space are constrained, among other things, by 
economic considerations (beyond a certain level, system improvements may exhibit 
declining marginal utility; Stich, 1990), historical vicissitude (the appropriate mutations 
must occur if selection is to act on them) and the topography of the fitness landscape 
(selection cannot access optimal design solutions if it must traverse a fitness valley to do 
so; Dennett, 1995a). Because evolution is an imperfect design process, the systems we 
have evolved for representing reality are bound to be limited – and sometimes they will 
break. 
 
5. Misbeliefs as the output of a properly functioning system 
Even if evolution were in some sense a “perfect” design process, there would still be 
limitations; only a violation of the laws of physics would permit, say, beliefs to be 
formed instantaneously, with no time lag whatsoever, or for an individual, finite believer 
to carry around in her head beliefs about the lack of prime factors of each specific prime 
number (only a brain of infinite volume could represent each individual prime).ix The 
result is that even the beliefs of textbook Bayesians will frequently be false (or at least 
incomplete) – and such misbeliefs cannot be considered “culpable”. 
 
Perhaps the most obvious examples of commonplace, forgivable misbelief occur when 
we are victimised by liars. Although extreme gullibility might be seen as dysfunctional 
(perhaps involving a Factor-2 bias toward observational adequacy), most of us 
(Bayesians included) are vulnerable to carefully crafted and disseminated falsehood. 
However adaptive it may be for us to believe truly, it may be adaptive for other parties if 
we believe falsely (Wallace, 1973).x An evolutionary arms race of deceptive ploys and 
counterploys may thus ensue. In some cases the “other parties” in question may not even 
be animate agents, but cultural traits or systems (Dawkins, 2006a,b; Dennett, 1995a, 
2006a). Although such cases are interesting in their own right, the adaptive misbeliefs we 
pursue in this paper are beneficial to their consumers - misbeliefs that evolve to the 
detriment of their believers are not our quarries. 
 
So, given inevitable contexts of imperfect information, even lightning-fast Bayesians will 
frequently misbelieve, and such misbeliefs must be deemed forgivable. We briefly 
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consider now whether certain departures from Bayesian updating might also be 
considered forgivable. Gigerenzer and colleagues (e.g. Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; 
Gigerenzer, Todd et al., 1999) have argued that some such departures, far from being 
defective, comprise “ecologically rational” decision strategies that operate effectively 
given inevitable limitations of time and computational resources. These researchers have 
documented and investigated a series of such “fast and frugal” heuristics, including the 
“take the best” heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999) and the “recognition heuristic” 
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). 
 
Some departures from normative rationality standards, however, result from perturbations 
in belief formation machinery and are not “heuristic” in any sense. As we have noted, 
bizarre misbeliefs like mirrored-self misidentification and Cotard delusion may occur 
subsequent to neuropsychological damage. For example, Young, Robertson, Hellawell, 
de Pauw & Pentland (1992) described a patient who was injured in a serious motorcycle 
accident and subsequently became convinced that he was dead. Computerised 
tomography (CT) scans revealed contusions affecting temporo-parietal areas of this 
patient’s right hemisphere as well as some bilateral damage to his frontal lobe. 
Misbeliefs, however, may also arise from less acute disruptions to the machinery of belief 
formation. For example, lapses in concentration due to fatigue or inebriation may result 
in individuals coming to hold erroneous beliefs, at least temporarily. Are such misbeliefs 
“culpable”? Do they reflect dysfunction in the belief formation system? 
 
Although misbelief might always reflect the limitations of the system in some sense, it is 
not always easy to tell (absent a warranty) where imperfect proper doxastic functioning 
(forgivably limited) ends and where (culpably limited) doxastic dysfunction begins. This 
fuzziness is reflected in the literature on certain putative psychological disorders. As an 
example, consider the phenomenon of disordered reading. There are debates in the 
literature about whether there is a separate category of individuals who are disordered 
readers (e.g. see Coltheart, 1996). Opponents of this view argue that so-called 
“disordered readers” are just readers at the lower end of a Gaussian distribution of 
reading ability. Similarly, one of the most controversial psychiatric diagnoses in recent 
years has been the diagnosis of Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), which 
some commentators insist is a figment, arguing that putatively ADHD children are just 
children at the extreme ends of Gaussian distributions of attention and activity (for a 
discussion, see Dennett, 1990a). 
 
Controversies such as these are difficult to resolve. While we consider that Millikan’s 
distinction between Normal and abNormal functioning provides a useful rule of thumb, 
we are not confident that this distinction – or any distinction – can be used to decisively 
settle disputes about forgivable versus culpable limitations in the biological domain. In 
this domain these categories are not discrete, but overlapping. Culpable misdesign in 
nature is always ephemeral - where design anomalies are rare or relatively benign, we 
will observe “tolerated” (forgivable) limitations; where anomalies begin to proliferate, 
however, they raise the selection pressure for a design revision, leading to either adaptive 
redesign or extinction. The upshot is that it may be difficult, if not impossible, to 
adjudicate on intermediate cases. How fatigued does an individual actually need to be 
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before his doxastic lapses are deemed (evolutionarily) forgivable? And if alcohol did not 
feature in the evolutionary history of the belief formation system, are false beliefs formed 
while tipsy forgivable? Perhaps dousing one’s brain in alcohol is akin to baking one’s 
Bolex in a hot oven – both are forced to labour “under external conditions not Normal for 
performance of their proper functions” (Millikan, 1993, p.74, emphasis in original). 
 
We acknowledge the overlap between our two broad categories of functioning. Such 
overlaps, however, characterise most biological categories: the boundaries - between, for 
example, species, or territories, or even between life and death - are porous and often 
violated. In any case, establishing a means of settling disputes about forgivable versus 
culpable limitations of the belief formation system is not crucial to our project. Although 
it is useful to be able to distinguish, crudely, between normal and abnormal doxastic 
functioning, the prevailing view is that misbeliefs formed in either case will themselves 
be abnormal. We will now begin to question this assumption. Contra the prevailing view, 
might there be certain situations in which misbelief can actually be adaptive (situations in 
which the misbeliefs themselves, not just the systems that produce them, are normal)? In 
those situations, if such there be, we would expect that we would be evolutionarily 
predisposed to form some misbeliefs. In short, misbelief would evolve. 
 
6. Adaptive misbelief? 
 
O who can hold a fire in his hand  
By thinking on the frosty Caucasus?  
Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite  
By bare imagination of a feast?  
Or wallow naked in December snow  
By thinking on fantastic summer's heat?  
 
~ Shakespeare (Richard II 1.3. 294-303) 
 
How does religion fit into a mind that one might have thought was designed to reject the palpably not true? 
The common answer—that people take comfort in the thought of a benevolent shepherd, a universal plan, 
of an afterlife—is unsatisfying, because it only raises the question of why a mind would evolve to find 
comfort in beliefs it can plainly see are false. A freezing person finds no comfort in believing he is warm; a 
person face-to-face-with a lion is not put at ease by the conviction that it is a rabbit. 
 
~ Pinker (1997, pp. 554-5, emphasis in original) 
 
We are anything but a mechanism set up to perceive the truth for its own sake. Rather, we have evolved a 
nervous system that acts in the interest of our gonads, and one attuned to the demands of reproductive 
competition. If fools are more prolific than wise men, then to that degree folly will be favored by selection. 
And if ignorance aids in obtaining a mate, then men and women will tend to be ignorant. 
 
~ Ghiselin (1974, p. 126) 
 
How could it ever be beneficial to believe a falsehood? Granted, one can easily imagine 
that in many circumstances it might feel better to misbelieve (more on this in section 10). 
Thus in Richard II, Bolingbroke, who has been banished, is urged by his father to 
imagine that he is not banished but rather has left of his own volition. Bolingbroke’s 
father appreciates that there may be psychological comfort in such a false belief. 
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Bolingbroke’s reply, however (“O who can hold a fire in his hand…”), speaks both to the 
difficulty of deliberately misbelieving as well as to the apparent absence of tangible 
benefits in thus misbelieving. How could misbelief aid survival? 
 
We note that it is easy to dream up anomalous offbeat scenarios where true beliefs are in 
fact detrimental for survival: 
 
[Harry] believed that his flight left at 7:45am… Harry’s belief was true, and he got to the airport 
just on time. Unfortunately, the flight crashed, and Harry died. Had Harry falsely believed that the 
flight left at 8:45, he would have missed the flight and survived. So true belief is sometimes less 
conducive to survival than false belief. (Stich, 1990, p. 123) 
 
As Stich (1990) notes, cases such as this are highly unusual, and do little to obviate the 
claim that true beliefs are generally adaptive (see also Millikan, 1993). After all, natural 
selection does not act on anomalous particulars, but rather upon reliable generalizations. 
Our question, then, is whether there might be cases where misbelief is systematically 
adaptive. 
 
7. The boy who cried wolf 
 
You’ve outdone yourself—as usual! 
 
~ Raymond Smullyan 
 
Theoretical considerations converging from several different research traditions suggest 
that any such systematic falsehood must be unstable, yielding ephemeral instances, at 
best, of misbelief. Recognition of the problem is as old as Aesop’s fable of the boy who 
cried wolf. Human communication between agents with memories and the capacity to 
check on the reliability of informants creates a dynamical situation in which systematic 
lying eventually exposes and discredits itself. As Quine (1960), Davidson (1994, 2001), 
Millikan (2004) and other philosophers have noted, without a prevailing background of 
truth-telling, communication will erode, a practice that cannot pay for itself. That does 
not mean, of course, that individual liars will never succeed for long, but just that their 
success depends on their being rare and hard to track. A parallel phenomenon in 
evolutionary biology is Batesian mimicry, in which a non-poisonous species (or type 
within a species) mimics the appearance of a poisonous species (telling a falsehood about 
itself), getting protection against predators without paying for the venom. When mimics 
are rare, predators avoid them, having had more encounters with the poisonous variety; 
when mimics are common, the mimicry no longer works as well. 
 
Quine and Ullian (1978) note an important wrinkle:  
 
If we could count on people to lie most of the time, we could get all the information from their 
testimony that we get under the present system [of predominant truth-telling]. We could even 
construe all their statements as containing an understood and unspoken ‘not’, and hence as 
predominantly true after all. Utterly random veracity, however, meshed with random mendacity, 
would render language useless for gathering information. (p. 52) 
 
 14
Isolated cases of the tacit negation suggested in this passage actually occur, when what 
might be called systematic irony erodes itself with repetition. “Terrific” no longer means 
“provoking terror” but almost its opposite, and if somebody calls your lecture 
“incredible” and “fantastic”, you should not take offence; they almost certainly don’t 
mean that they don’t believe a word of it and deem it to be out of touch with reality. A 
related phenomenon is “grade inflation” in academia. “B+” just doesn’t mean today what 
it used to mean several decades ago. When everybody is declared “better than average” 
the terms of the declaration are perforce diminished in meaning or credibility or both.  
 
What, if anything, would prevent similar accommodations from diluting the effect of 
systematic falsehoods within the belief formation system of an individual organism? We 
know from many experiments with subjects wearing inverting or distorting lenses (for a 
recent summary see Noë, 2004) that the falsehoods the eyes send the brain lead initially 
to false beliefs that seriously disable the subject, but in remarkably short time - a few 
days of accommodation - subjects have made an adjustment and can “get all the 
information from their testimony,” as Quine and Ullian (1978) say, just as if they had 
inserted a tacit “not” or switched the meaning of “right” and “left” in the visual system’s 
vocabulary. For a systematic falsehood-generating organ or tissue or network to have any 
staying power, it must send its lies to something that has little or no source memory or 
little or no plasticity in its evaluation of the credibility of the source.  
 
Something like that may well be the case in some sensory systems. Akins (1996) 
discusses “narcissistic” biases built into sensory systems in order to optimize relevance 
and utility for the animal’s behavioural needs. Instead of being designed to have their 
output states vary in unison (linearly) with the input conditions they are detecting (like 
thermometers or fuel gauges, which are designed to give objectively accurate 
measurements), these are designed to “distort” their responses (rather like the rear view 
mirror). She notes: “when a sensory system uses a narcissistic strategy to encode 
information, there need not be any counteracting system that has the task of decoding the 
output state” (p. 359). No “critics” or “lie detectors” devalue the message, and so the 
whole organism lives with a benign illusion of properties in the world that “just happen” 
to be tailor-made for its discernment.  For instance, feedback from muscle stretch 
receptors needs to be discriminating over several orders of magnitude, so the “meaning” 
of the spike trains varies continuously over the range, the sensitivity being adjusted as 
need be to maintain fine-grained information over the whole range. “What is important to 
realize, here, is that there need not be any further device that records the ‘position’ of the 
gain mechanism.” (p. 362).  In other words, no provision is made for reality-checking on 
what the stretch-receptors are “telling” the rest of the system, but the effect of this is to 
permit “inflation” to change the meaning of the spike frequency continuously.   
 
Here, then, are two distinct ways in which our nervous systems can gracefully adjust the 
use to which they put signals that one would brand as false were it not for the adjustment. 
In the phenomena induced by artificially distorting the sensory input, we can observe the 
adjustment over time, with tell-tale behavioural errors and awkwardness giving way to 
quite effective and apparently effortless responses as the new meanings of the input 
 15
signals get established. In the sort of cases Akins discusses, there is no precedent, no 
“traditional meaning,” to overcome, so there is no conflict to observe.  
 
8. Alief and belief 
Sometimes, however, the conflicts are not so readily resolved and the inconsistencies in 
behaviour do not evaporate. Gendler (2008) notes the need for a category of quasi-beliefs 
and proposes to distinguish between alief and belief:  
 
Paradigmatic alief can be characterized as a mental state with associatively-linked content that is 
representational, affective and behavioral, and that is activated – consciously or unconsciously – 
by features of the subject’s internal or ambient environment. Alief is a more primitive state than 
either belief or imagination: it directly activates behavioral response patterns (as opposed to 
motivating in conjunction with desire or pretended desire.) (Gendler, abstract) 
 
A person who trembles (or worse) when standing on the glass-floored Skywalk that 
protrudes over the Grand Canyon does not believe she is in danger, any more than a 
moviegoer at a horror film does, but her behaviour at the time indicates that she is in a 
belief-like state that has considerable behavioural impact.  The reluctance of subjects in 
Paul Rozin’s (Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986) experiments with disgust to come in 
contact with perfectly clean but disgusting looking objects does not indicate that they 
actually believe the objects are contaminated; in Gendler’s terms, they alieve this. In a 
similar vein, patients with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder generally don’t believe that 
the repetitive behaviours they feel compelled to engage in are necessary to prevent some 
dreaded occurrence – but they may well alieve this. (The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 
463] contains a specifier for OCD with “poor insight”, which denotes patients who fail to 
recognise that their obsessions and compulsions are “excessive or unreasonable”. In such 
patients alief may be overlaid with belief.) 
 
Are such aliefs adaptive? Probably not. They seem to join other instances of “tolerated” 
side effects of imperfect systems, but in any case they are not beliefs proper. The 
question before us now is whether we ever evolve systems for engendering false beliefs: 
informational states of global and relatively enduring (inflation-proof) significance to the 
whole organism that miss the usual target of truth and do so non-coincidentally.    
 
9. Error Management Theory 
 
[B]elief-formation systems that are maximally accurate (yielding beliefs that most closely approximate 
external reality) are not necessarily those that maximize the likelihood of survival: natural selection does 
not care about truth; it cares only about reproductive success. 
 
~ Stich (1990, p. 62) 
 
[T]he human mind shows good design, although it is design for fitness maximization, not truth 
preservation. 
 
~ Haselton and Nettle (2006, p. 63) 
 
The brain functions so that we tend to construe as true what is reproductively efficacious – true or not. 
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~ Schloss (2006, p. 191, emphasis in original) 
 
Beliefs are notoriously hard to count. Is the belief that 3+1=4 distinct from the belief that 
1+3=4 or are these just one belief? Can you have one without the other? (See Dennett, 
1982, for an analysis of the problems attendant on such questions.) No matter how we 
individuate beliefs, we might expect that optimal systems of belief and decision would be 
maximally accurate. Given the contexts in which decisions are made, however, trade-offs 
may arise between overall accuracy and accuracy in certain situations. Dennett illustrates 
this point: 
 
[I]t might be better for beast B to have some false beliefs about whom B can beat up and whom B 
can’t. Ranking B’s likely antagonists from ferocious to pushover, we certainly want B to believe it 
can’t beat up all the ferocious ones and can beat up all the obvious pushovers, but it is better 
(because it “costs less” in discrimination tasks and protects against random perturbations such as 
bad days and lucky blows) for B to extend “I can’t beat up x” to cover even some beasts it can in 
fact beat up. Erring on the side of prudence is a well-recognized good strategy, and so Nature can 
be expected to have valued it on occasions when it came up. (Dennett, 1987, p. 51, fn. 3, emphasis 
in original) 
 
Stich echoes the logic of this scenario with an example of his own: 
 
Consider, for example, the question of whether a certain type of food is poisonous. For an 
omnivore living in a gastronomically heterogeneous environment, a false positive on such a 
question would be relatively cheap. If the organism comes to believe that something is poisonous 
when it is not, it will avoid that food unnecessarily. This may have a small negative impact on its 
chances of survival and successful reproduction. False negatives, on the other hand, are much 
more costly in such situations. If the organism comes to believe that a given kind of food is not 
poisonous when it is, it will not avoid the food and will run a substantial risk of illness or death. 
(1990, pp. 61-62) 
 
What these examples suggest is that when there are reliable “asymmetries in the costs of 
errors” (Bratman, 1992), i.e. when one type of error (false positive or false negative) is 
consistently more detrimental to fitness than the other, then a system that is biased toward 
committing the less costly error may be more adaptive than an unbiased system. The 
suggestion that biologically engineered systems of decision and belief formation exploit 
such adaptations is the basis of Error Management Theory (EMT; Haselton, 2007; 
Haselton & Buss, 2000, 2003; Haselton & Nettle, 2006). According to EMT, cognitive 
errors (including misbeliefs) are not necessarily malfunctions reflecting (culpable) 
limitations of evolutionary design; rather, such errors may reflect judicious systematic 
biases that maximise fitness despite increasing overall error rates. 
 
Haselton and Buss (2000) use EMT to explain the apparent tendency of men to 
overperceive the sexual interest and intent of women (Abbey, 1982; Haselton, 2003). 
They argue that, for men, the perception of sexual intent in women is a domain 
characterised by recurrent cost asymmetries, such that the cost of inferring sexual intent 
where none exists (a false-positive error) is outweighed by the cost of falsely inferring a 
lack of sexual intent (a false-negative). The former error may cost some time and effort 
spent in fruitless courtship, but the latter error will entail a missed sexual and thus 
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reproductive opportunity – an altogether more serious outcome as far as fitness is 
concerned. 
 
For women, the pattern of cost asymmetries is basically reversed. The cost of inferring a 
man’s interest in familial investment where none exists (a false-positive error) would tend 
to outweigh the cost of falsely inferring a lack of such interest (a false-negative). The 
former error may entail the woman consenting to sex and being subsequently abandoned, 
a serious outcome indeed in arduous ancestral environments. The latter error, on the other 
hand, would tend merely to delay reproduction for the woman – a less costly error, 
especially given that reproductive opportunities are generally easier for women to acquire 
than men (Haselton, 2007). In view of such considerations, proponents of EMT predict 
that women will tend to underperceive the commitment intentions of men, a prediction 
apparently supported by empirical evidence (Haselton, 2007; Haselton & Buss, 2000). 
 
Other EMT predictions that have received apparent empirical support include the 
hypotheses that recurrent cost asymmetries have produced evolved biases toward 
overinferring aggressive intentions in others (Duntley & Buss, 1998; Haselton & Buss, 
2000), particularly members of other racial and ethnic groups (Haselton & Nettle, 2006; 
Krebs and Denton, 1997; Quillian & Pager, 2001); toward overinferring potential danger 
with regard to snakes (see Haselton & Buss, 2003; Haselton & Nettle, 2006); toward 
underestimating the arrival time of approaching sound sources (Haselton & Nettle, 2006; 
Neuhoff, 2001); and - reflecting Stich’s (1990) example above – toward overestimating 
the likelihood that food is contaminated (see Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Markwith, & 
Ross, 1990). The error management perspective, moreover, appears to be a fecund source 
of new predictions. In the realm of sexuality and courtship, for example, Haselton and 
Nettle (2006) predict biases toward over-inferring the romantic or sexual interest of a) 
others in one’s partner (what they term the “interloper effect”); and b) one’s partner in 
others. These predictions complement a series of other already confirmed predictions 
stemming from evolutionary analyses of jealousy (see Buss & Haselton, 2005, for a brief 
review). 
 
One objection that might be raised at this point is that the above examples need not 
actually involve misbelief. Stich’s omnivore need not believe that the food in question is 
poisonous – it might remain quite agnostic on that score. Similarly, jealous individuals 
need not harbour beliefs about partner infidelity – they might just be hypervigilant for any 
signs of it. The issue here is what doxastic inferences can be drawn from behaviour. After 
all, we always look before crossing a road, even where we are almost positive that there 
is no oncoming traffic. Our actions in such a case should not be read as reflecting a belief 
that there is an oncoming vehicle, but rather as reflecting a belief that there might be an 
oncoming vehicle (and the absence of a vehicle does not render that latter belief false). If 
we had to bet our lives one way or another on the matter, we might well bet that there 
isn’t an oncoming vehicle (Bratman, 1992). Betting our lives one way or the other, 
however, is a paradigm case of error symmetry (if we’re wrong, we die – no matter which 
option we choose). In everyday cases of crossing the road, however, the errors are 
radically asymmetrical – an error one way may indeed mean serious injury or death, but 
an error the other way will entail only a trivial waste of time and energy. 
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The upshot of this criticism is that tendencies to “overestimate” the likelihood that food is 
contaminated, to “overperceive” the sexual interest of women, or to “overinfer” 
aggressive intentions in others, may reflect judicious decision criteria for action rather 
than misbeliefs. Nature may well prefer to create a bias on the side of prudence, but she 
does not always need to instil erroneous beliefs to accomplish this.  She may instead 
make do with cautious action policies that might be expressed as “when in doubt 
[regarding some state of affairs relevant to current welfare], do x.” Errors, therefore, may 
not need to be managed doxastically (see McKay & Efferson, in preparation, for a 
thorough treatment of these issues). Some authors, however, have suggested that certain 
delusions also involve error management processes. Schipper, Easton and Shackelford 
(2007), for example, conceptualise delusional jealousy (also known as morbid jealousy or 
Othello syndrome) as the extreme end of a Gaussian distribution of jealousy, and 
hypothesise that the same sex-specific patterns that characterise “normal” jealousy - 
stemming from recurrent divergence in the adaptive problems faced by each gender - will 
also characterise delusional jealousy: “hypersensitive jealousy mechanisms… may serve 
the adaptive purpose of preventing partner infidelity” (p. 630; see also Easton, Schipper, 
& Shackelford, 2007). Whereas it may be true, therefore, that errors are not ordinarily 
managed doxastically, surely delusions involve genuine belief? 
 
There are, however, serious objections to the notion that delusions are beliefs (Hamilton, 
2007; Stephens & Graham, 2004; see Bayne & Pacherie, 2005, for a defence of the 
“doxastic conception”). One objection stems from the observation that although some 
individuals act on their delusions - and sometimes violently (see Mowat, 1966; Silva, 
Ferrari, Leong and Penny, 1998) - other deluded individuals frequently fail to act in 
accordance with their delusions. Individuals with Capgras delusion, for example, rarely 
file missing persons reports on behalf of their replaced loved ones, and those who claim 
to be Napoleon are seldom seen issuing orders to their troops (Young, 2000). In response 
to such objections, some authors have provided characterisations of delusions that 
dispense with the doxastic stipulation. Jaspers (1913/1963) and Berrios (1991), for 
example, have each proposed “non-assertoric” accounts of delusions (Young, 1999). 
Jaspers (1913/1963) held that schizophrenic delusions are not understandable, while for 
Berrios (1991) the verbalizations of deluded patients are empty speech acts, mere noise 
masquerading as mentality. Other authors have put forward “metacognitive” accounts of 
delusions, whereby delusions are conceived as higher order meta-evaluations of standard, 
lower order mental items. For example, Currie and colleagues (Currie, 2000; Currie & 
Jureidini, 2001; see Bayne & Pacherie, 2005 for a critique) argue that delusions are in 
fact imaginings misidentified as beliefs. On this account, the delusional belief of a Cotard 
patient is not the belief that she is dead, but rather the belief that she believes she is dead 
– when in fact she only imagines that she is dead (see Stephens & Graham, 2004, for a 
variant of the metacognitive thesis). 
 
In any case, it may be misguided to invoke delusions in attempting to link error 
management with adaptive misbelief. The reason is simple: even if one overlooks 
objections to the doxastic conception and insists that delusions are beliefs, a serious 
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problem remains – the issue of whether delusions can, in any sense, be regarded as 
adaptive. We consider this question below. 
 
10. Doxastic shear pins 
In this paper we have distinguished two broad categories of misbelief – on the one hand a 
category of misbeliefs resulting from breaks in the belief formation system, and on the 
other a category of misbeliefs arising in the normal course of belief system operations. 
Here we briefly consider an intriguing intermediate possibility: misbeliefs enabled by the 
action of “doxastic shear pins”. A shear pin is a metal pin installed in, say, the drive train 
of a marine engine, that locks the propeller to the propeller shaft and that is intended to 
“shear” should the propeller hit a log or other hard object. Shear pins are mechanical 
analogues of electrical fuses – each is a component in a system that is designed to break 
(in certain circumstances) so as to protect other, more expensive parts of the system. 
When a shear pin breaks (or a fuse blows), the system ceases its normal function. 
However, the action of the shear pin or fuse is not itself abnormal in these situations – in 
fact it is functioning perfectly as designed. 
 
What might count as a doxastic analogue of shear pin breakage? We envision doxastic 
shear pins as components of belief evaluation machinery that are 
“designed” to break in situations of extreme psychological stress (analogous to the 
mechanical overload that breaks a shear pin or the power surge that blows a fuse). 
Perhaps the normal function (both normatively and statistically construed) of such 
components would be to constrain the influence of motivational processes on belief 
formation. Breakage of such components,xi therefore, might permit the formation and 
maintenance of comforting misbeliefs – beliefs that would ordinarily be rejected as 
ungrounded, but that would facilitate the negotiation of overwhelming circumstances 
(perhaps by enabling the management of powerful negative emotions) and that would 
thus be adaptive in such extraordinary circumstances. 
 
Insofar as these misbeliefs were delusions, they would have a different aetiology to the 
more clear-cut cases of “deficit delusions” discussed earlier (mirrored-self 
misidentification and the like), because the breakage permitting their formation would 
serve a defensive, protective function. In short, they would be motivated (see Bayne & 
Fernández, 2009; McKay, forthcoming; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007a, 2009). 
Psychoanalytically inclined authors have proposed motivational interpretations of 
delusions such as the Capgras and Cotard delusions (e.g. see Enoch & Ball, 2001), but in 
the wake of more rigorous cognitive neuropsychiatric models such interpretations tend to 
be viewed with disdain as outlandish and anachronistic (Ellis, 2003). 
 
Claims about motivational aetiologies for delusions are more plausible in other domains, 
however. Consider, for example, the following case of reverse Othello syndrome (Butler, 
2000). The patient in question, “BX”, was a gifted musician who had been left a 
quadriplegic following a car accident. BX subsequently developed delusions about the 
continuing fidelity of his former romantic partner (who had in fact severed all contact 
with him and embarked on a new relationship soon after his accident). According to 
Butler, BX’s delusional system provided a “defense against depressive overwhelm… 
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[going] some way toward reconferring a sense of meaning to his life experience and 
reintegrating his shattered sense of self. Without it there was only the stark reality of 
annihilating loss and confrontation with his own emotional devastation” (2000, p. 89). 
Although this seems a plausible motivational formulation, this is an isolated case study 
and Butler’s theorising is unavoidably post hoc. Moreover, the fact that BX had sustained 
severe head injuries in his accident opens up the possibility that any breakage in his belief 
evaluation system was, as it were, ateleological - adventitious, not designed. More 
general (plausible) motivational interpretations exist for other delusions, however – 
especially for so-called “functional” delusions, where the nature and role of underlying 
neuropathy (if any) is unspecified (Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; Langdon, McKay, & 
Coltheart, 2008). In particular, there are well worked out motivational formulations for 
persecutory delusions (see Bentall & Kaney, 1996; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996, 1997), 
interpretations that have garnered recent empirical support (McKay, Langdon, & 
Coltheart, 2007b; Moritz, Werner, & von Collani, 2006; although see Vazquez, Diez-
Alegria, Hernandez-Lloreda & Moreno, 2008). 
 
It seems, therefore, that certain delusions might serve plausible defensive functions. 
Whether this implies that such delusions are adaptive, however, is a different question. 
To be sure, it might plausibly be argued that delusions are psychologically adaptive in 
certain scenarios (as the above reverse Othello case suggests). But this does not establish 
a case for biological adaptation. Here we must be careful to honour a distinction, often 
complacently ignored, between human happiness and genetic fitness.  If the most 
promising path, on average, to having more surviving grandoffspring is one that involves 
pain and hardship, natural selection will not be deterred in the least from pursuing it (it is 
well to remind ourselves of the insect species in which the males are beheaded in the 
normal course of copulation, or - somewhat closer to home - the ruthless siblingcide 
practiced by many bird species). Perhaps the most that can presently be claimed is that 
delusions may be produced by extreme versions of systems that have evolved in 
accordance with error management principles, i.e. evolved so as to exploit recurrent cost 
asymmetries. As extreme versions, however, there is every chance that such systems 
manage errors in a maladaptive fashion. As Zolotova and Brüne conclude, “[T]he content 
of delusional beliefs could be interpreted as pathological variants of adaptive 
psychological mechanisms…” (2006, p. 192, our emphasis; see also Brüne, 2001, 2003, 
in press). 
 
In view of these caveats, it is unclear whether delusions could form via the teleological 
“shearing” of particular belief components under stressful circumstances. Non-delusional 
misbeliefs, however, might potentially be formed in something like this way (see section 
13 for a discussion of health illusions). To an extent the issue here is merely stipulative, 
hinging on the definition of “delusion” one adopts. If delusions are dysfunctional by 
definition, then they cannot be adaptive. Moreover, many have reported that, in times of 
great stress, faith in God has given them “the strength to go on”. It may be true that there 
are no atheists in foxholes (although see Dennett, 2006b), but if delusions are defined so 
as to exclude conventional religious beliefs (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), 
then even if foxhole theism is biologically adaptive it will not count as an instance of 
biologically adaptive delusion. 
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Accounts of religious belief as an adaptation in general have been proposed by a number 
of commentators (e.g. Johnson & Bering, 2006; Wilson, 2002; but see Dennett, 2006a, 
for a critique and an alternative evolutionary account). Given the costs associated with 
religious commitment (see Bulbulia, 2004; Sosis, 2004; Dawkins, 2006a; Ruffle & Sosis, 
2007), it seems likely that such commitment is accompanied by bona fide belief of one 
sort or another (it might be only bona fide belief in belief–see Dennett 2006a). We 
therefore consider now whether in religion we have a candidate domain of adaptive 
misbelief. 
 
11. Supernatural agency 
Interestingly, error management logic pervades contemporary thinking about the origin of 
religion, and is also apparent in some less contemporary thinking: 
 
"God is, or He is not" … What will you wager? ... Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering 
that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose 
nothing. Wager then without hesitation that He is. 
 
Pascal’s famous wager provides perhaps the quintessential statement of error 
management logic, although it is important to note that the wager is an outcome of 
domain general rationality, whereas error management as implemented by evolved 
cognitive mechanisms is always domain specific (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). One such 
domain relevant to religion is the domain of agency detection. Guthrie (1993) has argued 
that a bias toward inferring the presence of agents would have been adaptive in the 
evolutionary past: “It is better for a hiker to mistake a boulder for a bear, than to mistake 
a bear for a boulder” (1993, p. 6). He argues further that religious belief may be a by-
product of evolved cognitive mechanisms that produce such biases – mechanisms that 
Barrett (2000) has termed “Hyperactive agent-detection devices” (“HADDs”). As a by-
product theory of religion (see below), this account provides little suggestion that 
religious belief is adaptive misbelief. Other authors, however, have proposed accounts of 
religion as an adaptation that incorporate error management logic. 
 
For example, Johnson, Bering and colleagues (Bering & Johnson, 2005; Johnson, 2005; 
Johnson & Bering, 2006; Johnson & Krueger, 2004; Johnson, Stopka, & Knights, 2003) 
have advanced a “supernatural punishment hypothesis” regarding the evolution of human 
cooperation. The nature and extent of human cooperation poses a significant evolutionary 
puzzle (Fehr & Gaechter, 2002). Human societies are strikingly anomalous in this respect 
relative to other animal species, as they are based on large-scale cooperation between 
genetically unrelated individuals (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, 2004). Classic adaptationist 
accounts of cooperation such as kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and direct reciprocity 
(Trivers, 1971) cannot explain these features of human cooperation. Moreover, the 
theories of indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987) and costly signalling (Gintis, Smith, & 
Bowles, 2001; Zahavi, 1995), which show how cooperation can emerge in larger groups 
when individuals have the opportunity to establish reputations, struggle to explain the 
occurrence of cooperation in situations that preclude reputation formation - such as in 
anonymous, one-shot economic games (Fehr & Gaechter, 2002; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & 
Fehr, 2003; Henrich & Fehr, 2003). 
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Johnson, Bering and colleagues (Bering & Johnson, 2005; Johnson, 2005; Johnson & 
Bering, 2006; Johnson & Krueger, 2004; Johnson, Stopka, & Knights, 2003) argue that 
belief in morally interested supernatural agents – and fear of punishment by such agents - 
may sustain cooperation in such situations. The argument they put forward is based 
explicitly on error management theory. They suggest that the evolutionary advent of 
language, on the one hand, and Theory of Mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978), on 
the other (specifically, the evolution of the “intentionality system”, a component of ToM 
geared toward representing mental states as the unseen causes of behaviour; Bering, 
2002; Povinelli & Bering, 2002), occasioned a novel set of selection pressures. In 
particular, the evolution of these cognitive capabilities increased the costs associated with 
social defection (because one’s social transgressions could be reported to absent third 
parties), and thus increased the adaptiveness of mechanisms that inhibit selfish actions.  
 
Belief in supernatural punishment – an incidental by-product of the intentionality system 
- is one such mechanism. Theirs is thus an argument for supernatural belief as exaptation 
(Gould & Vrba, 1982), a fact that is important for the plausibility of their model. Their 
central claim is that selection would favour exaggerated estimates of the probability 
and/or consequences of detection, and thus would favour belief in morally interested 
supernatural agents. It is not clear, however, that the latter would be necessary to drive 
the former. Selection might simply implement biased beliefs regarding the probability 
and/or consequences of detection (cutting out the middle man, as it were). Even more 
parsimoniously, selection might favour accurate beliefs and implement appropriately 
judicious action policies vis-à-vis social situations (cf. the social exchange heuristic of 
Yamagishi, Terai, Kiyonari, Mifune, & Kanazawa, 2007). As per our earlier observations 
regarding evolutionary explorations in Design Space, however, such ‘simpler’ solutions 
might be unavailable to selection; it may be that the most direct means of inhibiting 
selfish behaviour is via supernatural punishment beliefs. If such beliefs were already on 
the evolutionary scene as by-products of pre-existing intentionality system structures, 
then they could be conveniently co-opted without any need for the engineering of novel 
neuro-cognitive machinery (see Bering, 2006). 
 
The argument depends on a crucial error management assumption – that the costs of the 
two relevant errors in this novel selection environment are recurrently asymmetric, i.e. 
the cost of cheating and being caught reliably exceeds the cost of cooperating when 
cheating would have gone undetected. Provided that this inequality obtains, the theory 
claims that a propensity to believe in morally interested supernatural agents would have 
been selected for, because individuals holding such beliefs would tend to err on the 
(cooperative) side of caution in their dealings with conspecifics. “Machiavellian” 
unbelievers would not therefore gain an advantage, as they would lack important 
“restraints on self-interested conduct” and thus be “too blatantly selfish for the subtleties 
of the new social world” (Johnson, 2005, p. 414). 
 
What is the evidence for this theory? Johnson (2005) utilized data from Murdock and 
White’s (1969) Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) of 186 human societies around 
the globe to test whether the concept of supernatural punishment – indexed by the 
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importance of moralizing “high gods” – was associated with cooperation. He found “high 
gods” to be “significantly associated with societies that are larger, more norm compliant 
in some tests (but not others), loan and use abstract money, are centrally sanctioned, 
policed, and pay taxes” (p. 426; see also Roes & Raymond, 2003). As Johnson 
acknowledges, his measures of supernatural punishment and cooperation were imprecise 
(a limitation of the data set employed), and his evidence is correlational at best – the 
causal relationship between supernatural punishment beliefs and cooperation remains 
obscure. The same criticisms apply to Rossano’s (2007) argument that the emergence (in 
the Upper Palaeolithic) of certain ancient traits of religion (involving belief in “ever-
vigilant spiritual monitors”; p. 272) coincides with evidence for a dramatic advance in 
human cooperation (see Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008, for a review of further studies 
reporting correlational evidence of religious prosociality). 
 
In view of this criticism, studies that elicit causal evidence for the supernatural 
punishment hypothesis are crucial. The findings of a recent study by Shariff and 
Norenzayan (2007) are worth considering in this regard. These authors used a scrambled-
sentence paradigm to implicitly prime “God” concepts, and found that participants 
primed in this manner gave significantly more money in a subsequent (anonymous, one-
shot) economic game (the Dictator Game; see Camerer, 2003) than control participants. 
In discussing these results, Shariff and Norenzayan made appeal to a “supernatural 
watcher” interpretation of their findings, suggesting that their religious primes “aroused 
an imagined presence of supernatural watchers, and that this perception then increased 
prosocial behavior” (p. 807). As Randolph-Seng and Nielsen (2008) note, however, this 
interpretation may be less parsimonious than a behavioural-priming or ideomotor-action 
account (which Shariff and Norenzayan also considered), in which the activation of 
specific perceptual-conceptual representations increases the likelihood of behaviour 
consistent with those representations (see Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, & Aarts, 2007). Thus, 
much as people walk more slowly when the concept “elderly” is primed (Bargh, Chen, & 
Burrows, 1996), priming words that are semantically associated with prosocial behaviour 
(including words such as “God” and “prophet”, both of which were utilised as “religious 
primes” by Shariff and Norenzayan) may lead to such behaviour simply by virtue of that 
association. 
 
The behavioural-priming or ideomotor-action explanation is buttressed by the results of 
Shariff and Norenzayan’s second study, which showed that implicitly primed “secular” 
concepts were comparable to implicitly primed “God” concepts in terms of their effect on 
giving in a subsequent Dictator Game. As Randolph-Seng and Nielsen (2008) point out, 
it is not clear why secular primes such as “civic” and “contract”, that contain no reference 
to God, should enhance prosocial behaviour if such behaviour results from the activation 
of “supernatural watcher” concepts. Nevertheless, we feel that the research design of 
Shariff and Norenzayan (and that of comparable recent studies; see Pichon, Boccato, & 
Saroglou, 2007; Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007) is insufficient to adequately 
discriminate between the supernatural watcher and behavioural-priming interpretations. 
What is needed is a study that clearly separates the influence of an “agency” dimension 
(whether natural or supernatural) from a “prosociality” dimension. The appeal of the 
supernatural punishment hypothesis is that it shows how reputational concerns might 
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influence behaviour in situations that preclude actual reputation formation. It is true that 
the “religious prime” and “secular prime” categories utilized by Shariff and Norenzayan 
both included words potentially associated semantically with prosocial behaviour. We 
note, however, that both word categories also include words potentially associated with 
agency (“God” and “prophet” in the former category, “jury” and “police” in the latter). It 
may be that the surveillance connotations of a word such as “police” may mean that 
priming with this word enhances prosocial behaviour by activating reputational concerns 
– not by semantic association with prosociality! Future studies would do well to tease 
these factors apart. 
 
Recent research by Bering, McLeod and Shackelford (2005) employed a different 
paradigm to elicit causal evidence regarding the effect of a supernatural watcher (albeit a 
supernatural watcher without obvious moral interests). In one condition of their third 
study, undergraduate students were casually informed that the ghost of a dead graduate 
student had recently been noticed in the testing room. These participants were 
subsequently less willing than control participants to cheat on a competitive computer 
task, despite a low apparent risk of social detection. This result is intriguing, and not 
obviously susceptible to explanation in terms of behavioural-priming effects (cf. 
Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007). As the relevant information was not collected, 
however, it is not clear to what extent the effect of the ghost prime in this study was 
mediated by participants’ belief in ghosts. This is an important point, as it raises the 
possibility that if behavioural effects are reliably elicited by supernatural primes, they 
may be elicited not by belief but by alief! (Gendler, 2008). Perhaps suitably primed 
participants alieve that a supernatural agent is watching, but believe no such thing. If this 
is the case, then such effects, although interesting, will have little bearing on the question 
of whether misbelief can be systematically adaptive. 
 
It turns out that the evidence is mixed regarding whether supernatural belief mediates the 
effect of supernatural primes on behaviour. In the first of Shariff and Norenzayan’s 
(2007) studies, the religious prime increased generosity for both theists and atheists. In 
their second study, however, the effect of the religious prime was stronger for theists than 
atheists (and in fact non-significant for atheists). It may be that this difference is 
attributable to the more stringent atheist criterion employed in the latter study, in which 
case belief may be crucial. Recent work by Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key and Busath 
(2007), which found that scriptural violence sanctioned by God increased aggression, 
especially in religious participants, is consistent with this proposition. However, 
Randolph-Seng and Nielsen (2007) found that whereas participants primed with religious 
words cheated significantly less on a subsequent task than control participants, the 
intrinsic religiosity of participants did not interact with the prime factor.  
 
At present, therefore, there is no strong evidence that religious belief is important for the 
efficacy of religious primes, nor any strong evidence that such primes exert their effects 
by activating reputational concerns involving supernatural agents. Other approaches 
notwithstanding (e.g. Wilson, 2002; Sosis, 2004; Dawkins, 2006a), the currently 
dominant evolutionary perspective on religion remains a by-product perspective (Atran, 
2004; Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Bloom, 2004, 2005, 2007; Boyer, 2001, 2003, 2008; 
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Hinde, 1999). On this view, supernatural (mis)beliefs are side-effects of a suite of 
cognitive mechanisms adapted for other purposes. Such mechanisms render us 
hyperactive agency detectors (Guthrie, 1993; Barrett, 2000), promiscuous teleologists 
(Kelemen, 2004), and intuitive dualists (Bloom, 2004); collectively (and incidentally), 
they predispose us to develop religious beliefs – or at least they facilitate the acquisition 
of such beliefs (Bloom, 2007). Meanwhile, advocates of “strong reciprocity” (Fehr, 
Fischbacher, & Gaechter, 2002; Gintis, 2000) argue that the puzzle of large-scale human 
cooperation may be solved by invoking cultural group selection (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & 
Richerson, 2003; Henrich & Boyd, 2001) or gene–culture coevolution (Bowles, Choi, & 
Hopfensitz, 2003; see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, 2003). 
 
12. Self-deception 
 
When a person cannot deceive himself the chances are against his being able to deceive other people. 
 
~ Mark Twain 
 
[T]he first and best unconscious move of a dedicated liar is to persuade himself he’s sincere. 
 
~ Ian McEwan, “Saturday” 
 
Arguments that systematic misbelief may have been selected for its ability to facilitate 
the successful negotiation of social exchange scenarios are not confined to the domain of 
religion. In his foreword to the first edition of Richard Dawkins’ book The Selfish Gene, 
for example, the evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers outlined an influential theory of 
the evolution of self-deception:  
 
[I]f (as Dawkins argues) deceit is fundamental in animal communication, then there must be 
strong selection to spot deception and this ought, in turn, to select for a degree of self-deception, 
rendering some facts and motives unconscious so as not to betray – by the subtle signs of self-
knowledge – the deception being practiced. Thus, the conventional view that natural selection 
favors nervous systems which produce ever more accurate images of the world must be a very 
naïve view of mental evolution. (2006, p. xx; see also Trivers, 1985, 2000; Alexander, 1979, 1987; 
Lockard, 1978, 1980; Lockard & Paulhus, 1988) 
 
In the intervening years the notion that self-deception has evolved because it facilitates 
other-deception appears to have become something of a received view in evolutionary 
circles. The notion is not without its critics, however. Both Ramachandran and Blakeslee 
(1998) and Van Leeuwen (2007) have pointed out that deceivers who believe their own 
lies (regarding, say, the whereabouts of a food source) will not themselves be able to take 
advantage of the truth. Deception is thus clearly possible without self-deception. Van 
Leeuwen (2007) also claims the converse - that self-deception frequently occurs in the 
absence of any intention to deceive. On the basis of such considerations, Van Leeuwen 
argues that self-deception is not an adaptation but a by-product of other features of 
human cognitive architecture. 
 
In any case, Trivers’ theory has received surprisingly little empirical attention, and we 
know of no direct empirical evidence that the theory is valid. Indeed, a recent study by 
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McKay, Novello and Taylor (in preparation) found preliminary evidence that high self-
deceivers were, if anything, less likely to be trusted in a cooperative exchange situation 
than low self-deceivers. These authors recruited groups of previously unacquainted 
participants, had them interact briefly with one another, and then invited each participant 
to play an anonymous, one-shot Prisoners Dilemma game with each other participant. 
Participants were subsequently told that they could double the stakes for one of these 
games. Individuals higher in self-deception (measured using the Self-Deceptive 
Enhancement [SDE] scale of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding [BIDR; 
Paulhus, 1988]) were less likely to be nominated for such double-stakes exchanges, 
suggesting that such individuals appeared less trustworthy than individuals lower in self-
deception. 
 
In a variant of Trivers’ dictum, Krebs and Denton (1997) state that “Illusions about one’s 
worth are adaptive because they help people deceive others about their worth” (p. 37; see 
also Smith, 2006). Given the lack of evidence that others are deceived about the worth of 
self-deceptive individuals, it is questionable whether “illusions about one’s worth” do in 
fact serve this function. Might such illusions serve other adaptive functions, however? 
Having peeled the onion down, and set aside a variety of inconclusive candidates for 
adaptive misbelief, we turn finally to an investigation of this question. 
 
13. Positive illusions 
 
The perception of reality is called mentally healthy when what the individual sees corresponds to what is 
actually there. 
 
~ Jahoda (1958, p. 6) 
 
[T]he healthy mind is a self-deceptive one. 
 
~ Taylor (1989, p. 126) 
 
In parallel with the prevailing evolutionary view of adaptive belief, a number of 
psychological traditions have regarded close contact with reality as a cornerstone of 
mental health (Jahoda, 1953, 1958; Maslow, 1950; Peck, 1978; Vaillant, 1977). A 
substantial body of research in recent decades, however, has challenged this view, 
suggesting instead that optimal mental health is associated with unrealistically positive 
self-appraisals and beliefs.xii Taylor and colleagues (e.g. Taylor, 1989; Taylor & Brown, 
1988) refer to such biased perceptions as “positive illusions”, where an illusion is “a 
belief that departs from reality” (Taylor & Brown, 1988, p. 194). Such illusions include 
unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of personal control or 
mastery, and unrealistic optimism about the future. 
 
For example, evidence indicates that there is a widespread tendency for most people to 
see themselves as better than most others on a range of dimensions. This is the “better-
than-average effect” (Alicke, 1985) - individuals, on the average, judge themselves to be 
more intelligent, honest, persistent, original, friendly and reliable than the average person. 
Most college students tend to believe that they will have a longer-than-average lifespan, 
while most college instructors believe that they are better-than-average teachers (Cross, 
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1977). Most people also tend to believe that their driving skills are better than average – 
even those who have been hospitalised for accidents (e.g. McKenna, Stanier, & Lewis, 
1991; Williams, 2003). In fact, most people view themselves as better than average on 
almost any dimension that is both subjective and socially desirable (Myers, 2002). 
Indeed, with exquisite irony, most people even see themselves as less prone to such self-
serving distortions than others (Friedrich, 1996; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004; Pronin, 
Lin, & Ross, 2002). 
 
Positive illusions may well be pervasive, but are they adaptive, evolutionarily speaking? 
For example, do such misbeliefs sustain and enhance physical health? Our positive 
illusions may “feel good” and yet contribute nothing to - or even be a tolerable burden 
upon - our genetic fitness, a side effect that evolution has not found worth blocking. On 
the other hand, they may be fitness-enhancing, in either of two quite different ways. They 
may lead us to undertake adaptive actions; or they may more directly sustain and enhance 
health, or physical fitness in the everyday sense. We consider each of these prospects in 
turn. 
 
First, let’s look at what happens when positive illusions affect the decisions we make in 
the course of deliberate, intentional action. Do these rosy visions actually lead people to 
engage in more adaptive behaviours? According to Taylor and Brown (1994), they do. 
These authors note that individuals with strong positive perceptions – and in particular, 
inflated perceptions - of their abilities are more likely to attain success than those with 
more modest self-perceptions. In this connection they quote Bandura: 
 
It is widely believed that misjudgment produces dysfunction. Certainly, gross miscalculation can 
create problems. However, optimistic self-appraisals of capability that are not unduly disparate 
from what is possible can be advantageous, whereas veridical judgments can be self-limiting. 
When people err in their self-appraisals, they tend to overestimate their capabilities. This is a 
benefit rather than a cognitive failing to be eradicated. If self-efficacy beliefs always reflected only 
what people could do routinely, they would rarely fail but they would not mount the extra effort 
needed to surpass their ordinary performances. (Bandura, 1989, p. 1177) 
 
Haselton and Nettle (2006) note the tacit error management perspective in Taylor and 
Brown’s conception of positive illusions:  
 
[I]f the [evolutionary] cost of trying and failing is low relative to the potential [evolutionary] 
benefit of succeeding, then an illusional positive belief is not just better than an illusional negative 
one, but also better than an unbiased belief… (Haselton & Nettle, 2006, p. 58; see also Nettle, 
2004)  
 
Although the link here with error management is interesting and relevant, it is worth 
pausing to consider the precise wording of this quote. Haselton and Nettle speak of an 
illusional positive belief as being better than an unbiased belief, when presumably what 
they mean is that a belief system geared toward forming illusional positive beliefs – 
assuming that such beliefs are consistently less detrimental to fitness than illusional 
negative beliefs - may be more adaptive than an unbiased belief system. Even if the 
misbeliefs arising through the operation of the former system arise through the normal 
operation of that system, the misbeliefs themselves must surely count as abnormal 
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(Millikan, 2004). After all, it’s not clear that there is anything adaptive about trying and 
failing (but see Dennett, 1995b). Smoke detectors biased toward false alarms are no 
doubt preferable to those biased toward the more costly errors (failures to detect actual 
fires); but that doesn’t mean that a false alarm is a cause for celebration. If a smoke 
detector came onto the market that detected every actual fire without ever sounding a 
false alarm, that would be the one to purchase. Even if they spring from adaptively biased 
misbelief-producing systems, therefore, individual misbeliefs about success are arguably 
more of a tolerable by-product than an adaptation. (Possible exceptions to this might be 
cases where individuals falsely believe that they will attain great success, yet where the 
confident striving engendered by such misbelief leads to greater success than would have 
been attained had they not falsely believed. Perhaps it is sometimes necessary to believe 
that you will win gold in order to have any chance of winning silver or bronze; see Krebs 
& Denton, 1997; Benabou & Tirole, 2002). 
 
Might there be evidence, however, that misbeliefs themselves can propel adaptive 
actions? Here we note that positive illusions need not be merely about oneself. Perhaps 
the most compelling indication that positively biased beliefs lead people to engage in 
biologically adaptive behaviours is when such beliefs concern other people – in 
particular, those we love. Gagné and Lydon (2004; see also Fowers, Lyons, & Montel, 
1996; Fowers, Lyons, Montel, & Shaked, 2001; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996) have 
found that the better-than-average effect applies for people’s appraisals not just of 
themselves but also of their partners - 95% judge their partners more positively than the 
average partner with respect to intelligence, attractiveness, warmth and sense of humour. 
Such biased appraisal mechanisms may be crucial to ensure the completion of species-
specific parental duties: “The primary function of love is to cement sexual relationships 
for a period of several years, in order to ensure that the vulnerable human infant receives 
care from its mother, resources from its father, and protection from both” (Tallis, 2005, p. 
194; see also Fisher, 2006). Note, in this connection, that biased appraisals of one’s 
children may also facilitate parental care: “[T]he ability of parents to deny the faults of 
their children sometimes seems to border on delusion” (Krebs & Denton, 1997, p. 34). 
Wenger and Fowers (2008) have recently provided systematic evidence of positive 
illusions in parenting. Most participants in their study rated their own children as 
possessing more positive (86%) and less negative (82%) attributes than the average child. 
This better-than-average effect, moreover, was a significant predictor of general 
parenting satisfaction. 
 
Finally, we consider evidence that positive illusions can directly sustain and enhance 
health. Research has indicated that unrealistically positive views of one’s medical 
condition and of one's ability to influence it are associated with increased health and 
longevity (Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003). For example, in studies 
with HIV-positive and AIDS patients, those with unrealistically positive views of their 
likely course of illness showed a slower illness course (Reed, Kemeny, Taylor, & 
Visscher, 1999) and a longer survival time (Reed, Kemeny, Taylor, Wang, & Visscher, 
1994; for a review see Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower, & Gruenewald, 2000). 
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Taylor et al. (2000) conjectured that positive illusions might work their medical magic by 
regulating physiological and neuroendocrine responses to stressful circumstances. Stress-
induced activation of the autonomic nervous system and the hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenocortical (HPA) axis facilitates “fight or flight” responses and is thus adaptive in the 
short-term. Chronic or recurrent activation of these systems, however, may be detrimental 
to health (see McEwen, 1998), so psychological mechanisms that constrain the activation 
of such systems (perhaps doxastic shear pins that break - or even just bend a little - in 
situations of heightened stress) may be beneficial. Consistent with the above hypothesis, 
Taylor et al. (2003) found that self-enhancing cognitions in healthy adults were 
associated with lower cardiovascular responses to stress, more rapid cardiovascular 
recovery, and lower baseline cortisol levels. 
 
Results linking positive illusions to health benefits are consistent with earlier findings 
that patients who deny the risks of imminent surgery suffer fewer medical complications 
and are discharged more quickly than other patients (Goleman, 1987, cited in Krebs & 
Denton, 1997), and that women who cope with breast cancer by employing a denial 
strategy are more likely to remain recurrence-free than those utilising other coping 
strategies (Dean & Surtees, 1989). In such cases the expectation of recovery appears to 
facilitate recovery itself, even if that expectation is unrealistic. This dynamic may be at 
work in cases of the ubiquitous placebo effect, whereby the administration of a medical 
intervention instigates recovery before the treatment could have had any direct effect and 
even when the intervention itself is completely bogus (Benedetti et al., 2003; Humphrey, 
2004).  
 
Placebos have been acclaimed, ironically, as “the most adaptable, protean, effective, safe 
and cheap drugs in the world’s pharmacopoeia” (Buckman & Sabbagh, 1993; cited in 
Humphrey, 2004). They have proven effective in the treatment of pain and inflammation, 
stomach ulcers, angina, heart disease, cancer and depression, among other conditions 
(Humphrey, 2002, 2004). From an evolutionary perspective, however, the placebo effect 
presents something of a paradox: 
 
When people recover from illness as a result of placebo treatments, it is of course their own 
healing systems that are doing the job. Placebo cure is self-cure. But if the capacity for self-cure is 
latent, then why is it not used immediately? If people can get better by their own efforts, why 
don’t they just get on with it as soon as they get sick – without having to wait, as it were, for  
outside permission? (Humphrey, 2004, p. 736, emphasis in original.) 
 
Humphrey (2002, 2004) considers the placebo effect in an evolutionary context and 
suggests an ingenious solution to this paradox. Noting that immune system functioning 
can be very costly, Humphrey construes the human immune response as under the 
regulation of an evolved administrative system that must manage resources as efficiently 
as possible. Because resources are limited, there is adaptive value to limiting resource 
expenditure just as there is value in the expenditure itself.  
 
Sound economic management requires forecasting the future, and thus the health 
management system would need to take into account any available information relevant 
to future prospects. Such data would include information about the nature of the threat 
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itself (including the likelihood of spontaneous remission), the costs of mounting an 
appropriate defence, and evidence relating to the course of the illness in other victims. 
Paramount among such sources of information, however, would be information about the 
availability of medical care: “People have learned… that nothing is a better predictor of 
how things will turn out when they are sick… than the presence of doctors, medicines, 
and so on” (Humphrey, 2004, p. 736). To put a military gloss on Humphrey’s economic 
resource management metaphor, there is less need for caution and conservation of 
resources once reinforcements arrive. Only then can one “spare no expense in hopes of a 
quick cure” (Dennett, 2006a, p. 138; emphasis in original). 
 
The placebo effect seems at first to be a case where misbelief in the efficacy of a 
particular treatment regimen (which, after all, may be a sham with zero direct efficacy) 
facilitates health and physical fitness. Is this, however, a case of evolved misbelief? If 
Humphrey’s account of the placebo effect is along the right lines, what evolved was a 
bias to attend to and wait for signs of security before triggering a full bore immune 
response, and these signs would, in the main, have been true harbingers of security 
(otherwise the bias would not have been adaptive and would not have evolved). As drug 
trials and placebos did not figure in our evolutionary history, they represent a later, 
artificial “tricking” of this evolved system, similar to the way calorie-free saccharine 
tricks our sweet tooth or pornography tricks our libido. Placebo misbelief, therefore, is 
not adaptive misbelief – it’s a by-product of an adaptation. In Humphrey’s words, the 
“human capacity for responding to placebos is… an emergent property of something else 
that is genuinely adaptive: namely, a specially designed procedure for ‘economic 
resource management’… Unjustified placebo responses, triggered by invalid hopes, must 
be counted a biological mistake” (2002, pp. 261 & 279, emphasis in original). 
 
Do similar remarks apply to the instances of positive illusion and health discussed above? 
Are the “unjustified” expectations and “invalid hopes” of some AIDS and cancer patients 
biologically mistaken? One might argue that if “unrealistic” optimism facilitates happy 
outcomes, then – in retrospect – such optimism was not so unrealistic after all! However, 
it seems clear that optimism in the relevant studies is not realistic optimism (even 
allowing that this is not an oxymoronic concept). For example, Reed et al. (1994) 
recruited gay men, who had been diagnosed with AIDS for about a year, for an 
investigation into the effect of positive illusions on physical health. As the data for this 
particular study were collected in the late 1980s, life expectancy for these men was not 
long, and two thirds of the men had died at the completion of the study. Realistic 
acceptance of death (measured by items including the reverse-scored item “I refuse to 
believe that this problem has happened”) was found to be a significant negative predictor 
of longevity, with high scorers on this measure typically dying nine months earlier than 
low scorers. This relationship remained significant when a variety of potential predictors 
of death were controlled for, including age, time since diagnosis, self-reported health 
status, and number of AIDS-related symptoms. It does seem, therefore, that the relevant 
beliefs here were unrealistically positive. “Foxhole” beliefs of a sort. 
 
In positive illusions situations such as those outlined above, the benefits accrue from 
misbelief directly – not merely from the systems that produce it. To return to the 
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terminology we introduced earlier, such doxastic departures from reality – such apparent 
limitations of veridicality - are not culpable but entirely forgivable: design features, even. 
These beliefs are “Normal” in the capitalised, Millikanian sense. In such situations, we 
claim, we have our best candidates for evolved misbelief. 
 
14. Ungrounded beliefs 
Although “natural selection does not care about truth; it cares only about reproductive 
success” (Stich, 1990, p. 62), true beliefs can have instrumental value for natural 
selection - insofar as they facilitate reproductive success. In many cases (perhaps most), 
beliefs will be adaptive by virtue of their veridicality. The adaptiveness of such beliefs is 
not independent of their truth or falsity. On the other hand, the adaptiveness (or 
otherwise) of some beliefs is quite independent of their truth or falsity. Consider, again, 
supernatural belief: If belief in an omniscient, omnipotent deity is adaptive because it 
inhibits detectable selfish behaviour (as per the Johnson & Bering theory that we 
discussed in section 11), this will be the case whether or not such a being actually exists. 
If such a being does not exist, then we have adaptive misbelief. However, were such a 
being to suddenly pop into existence, the beliefs of a heretofore false believer would not 
become maladaptive – they would remain adaptive. 
 
The misbeliefs that we have identified as sound candidates for adaptive misbelief are like 
the supernatural (mis)beliefs in the example above – although we claim that they were 
adaptive in themselves (not merely by-products of adaptively biased misbelief-producing 
systems), we do not claim that they were adaptive by virtue of their falsity: “Falseness 
itself could not be the point” (Millikan, 2004, p. 86). It may be adaptive to believe that 
one’s partner and one’s children are more attractive (…etc.) than the average, but such 
adaptive beliefs are only adaptive misbeliefs, on our definition, if they happen to be false. 
Good grounds may arise for believing these things (success in beauty pageants, excessive 
attention from rivals etc.), but such grounds will not render these beliefs any less 
adaptive. Their adaptiveness is independent of their truth or falsity. Any given adaptive 
misbeliever is thus an adaptive misbeliever because of contingent facts about the world – 
because her children are not actually as intelligent as she believes they are; because his 
prospects for recovery are not as good as he believes they are, etc. The upshot is that we 
do not expect adaptive misbeliefs to be generated by mechanisms specialised for the 
production of beliefs that are false per se. Instead, there will be evolved tendencies for 
forming specific ungrounded beliefs in certain domains. Where these beliefs are 
(contingently) false, we will see adaptive misbelief. 
 
Dweck and colleagues (Dweck, 1999; Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007) have 
shown a subtle instance of ungrounded belief (not necessarily false) that propels 
seemingly adaptive action. These authors distinguish two different “self-theories” of 
intelligence as part of the implicit “core beliefs” of adolescents: an “entity” theory 
(intelligence is a thing that you have a little or a lot of) and an “incremental” theory 
(intelligence is a malleable property that can develop). Those who hold an incremental 
theory are better motivated, work harder, and get better grades, and if students are taught 
an incremental theory in an intervention, they show significant improvement, and 
significantly more than a control group that is also given extra help but without the 
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incremental theory. In fact, if students are told (truly or falsely) that they are particularly 
intelligent (intelligence is an entity and they have quite a lot of it), they actually do worse 
than if not told this. Note that these results are independent of the issue of whether or not 
an entity theory or an incremental theory is closer to the truth (or the truth about 
particular students). So whether or not one’s intelligence is malleable, a belief that one’s 
intelligence is malleable seems to have a strong positive effect on one’s motivation and 
performance. It is tempting to conjecture that evolution has discovered this general 
tendency and exploited it: whenever a belief about a desirable trait is “subjective” 
(Myers, 2002), not likely to be rudely contradicted by experience, evolution should 
favour a disposition to err on the benign side, whatever it is, as this will pay dividends at 
little or no cost. Such an evolved bias could have the effect of installing a host of 
unrealistically positive beliefs about oneself or about the vicissitudes to be encountered in 
the environment. What would hold this tendency in check, preventing people from living 
in fantasy worlds of prowess and paradise? As usual, the tendency should be self-
limiting, with rash overconfidence leading to extinction in the not very long run (see 
Baumeister, 1989, regarding the “optimal margin of illusion”). 
 
If psychologists like Dweck can discover and manipulate these core beliefs today, our 
ancestors, with little or no theory or foresight, could have stumbled onto manipulations of 
the same factors and been amply rewarded by the effects achieved, turning their children 
into braver, more confident warriors, more trustworthy allies, more effective agents in 
many dimensions.  Cultural evolution can have played the same shaping and pruning role 
as genetic evolution, yielding adaptations that pay for themselves - as all adaptations 
must - in the differential replication of those who adopt the cultural items, or in the 
differential replication of the cultural items themselves (Dawkins, 2006b; Dennett, 
1995a), or both.  This in turn would open the door to gene-culture co-evolution such as 
has been demonstrated with lactose tolerance in human lineages with a tradition of dairy 
herding (Beja-Pereira et al., 2003; Feldman & Cavalli-Sforza, 1989; Holden & Mace, 
1997). Culturally evolved practices of inculcation could then create selective forces 
favouring those genetic variants that most readily responded to the inculcation, creating a 
genetically transmitted bias, a heightened susceptibility to those very practices (Dennett, 
2006a; McClenon, 2002). 
 
15. Conclusion 
 
The driving force behind natural selection is survival and reproduction, not truth. All other things being 
equal, it is better for an animal to believe true things than false things; accurate perception is better than 
hallucination. But sometimes all other things are not equal. 
 
~ Bloom (2004, pp. 222-223) 
 
[S]ystematic bias does not preclude a tether to reality. 
 
~ Haselton and Nettle (2006, p. 62) 
 
Simple folk psychology tells us that since people use their beliefs to select and guide their 
actions, true beliefs are always better than false beliefs - aside from occasional 
 33
unsystematic lucky falsehoods. But because our belief states have complex effects 
beyond simply informing our deliberations - they flavour our attitudes and feed our self-
images - and complex causes that can create additional ancillary effects - such as 
triggering emotional adjustments and immune reactions - the dynamics of actual belief 
generation and maintenance create a variety of phenomena that might be interpreted as 
evolved misbeliefs. In many cases these phenomena are better seen as prudent policies or 
sub-personal biases or quasi-beliefs (Gendler’s “aliefs”). Of the categories we consider, 
one survives: positive illusions. 
 
What is striking about these phenomena, from the point of view of the theorist of beliefs 
as representations, is that they highlight the implicit holism in any system of belief-
attribution. To whom do the relevant functional states represent the unrealistic 
assessment?  If only to the autonomic nervous system and the HPA, then theorists would 
have no reason to call the states misbeliefs at all, since the more parsimonious 
interpretation would be an adaptive but localized tuning of the error management systems 
within the modules that control these functions. But sometimes, the apparently benign 
and adaptive effect has been achieved by the maintenance of a more global state of 
falsehood (as revealed in the subjects’ responses to questionnaires, etc.) and this 
phenomenon is itself, probably, an instance of evolution as a tinkerer: in order to achieve 
this effect, evolution has to misinform the whole organism. 
 
We began this paper with a default presumption - that true beliefs are adaptive and 
misbeliefs maladaptive. This led naturally to the question of how to account for instances 
of misbelief. The answer to this question is twofold: First, the panglossian assumption 
that evolution is a perfect designer - and thus that natural selection will weed out each 
and every instance of a generally maladaptive characteristic - must be discarded. 
Evolution, as we have seen, is not a perfect design process, but is subject to economic, 
historical, and topographical constraints. We must therefore expect that the machinery 
that evolution has equipped us with for forming and testing beliefs will be less than 
“optimal” – and sometimes it will break. Moreover, we have seen a variety of ways in 
which these sub-optimal systems may generate misbeliefs not by malfunctioning but by 
functioning normally, creating families of errors that are, if not themselves adaptive, 
apparently tolerable. But beyond that, we have explored special circumstances where, as 
Bloom writes, “things are not equal” – where the truth hurts so systematically that we are 
actually better off with falsehood. We have seen that in such circumstances falsehood can 
be sustained by evolved systems of misbelief. So, in certain rarefied contexts, misbelief 
itself can actually be adaptive. Nevertheless, the truism that misinformation leads in 
general to costly missteps has not been seriously undermined: although survival is the 
only hard currency of natural selection, the exchange rate with truth is likely to be fair in 
most circumstances. 
 
                                                 
i Doxastic = of or pertaining to belief. 
ii We set aside, on this occasion, the important distinction between probabilistic and all-or-nothing 
conceptions of belief (e.g., Dennett’s, 1978, distinction between belief and opinion), as the issues explored 
here apply ingenerate to both conceptions. 
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iii For ease of exposition, we will tend to conflate “adaptive” and “adapted” throughout this paper. Because 
ecological niches change over time, these categories are overlapping but not equal: although all adapted 
traits must have been adaptive in the evolutionary past, they need not be adaptive in modern environments; 
likewise, traits that are currently adaptive are not necessarily adapted (they are not necessarily adaptations). 
This is, of course, an important distinction, but not much will turn on it for our purposes. 
iv Naturally, manufacturers and consumers do not always see eye to eye. Limitations that appear culpable 
from a consumer perspective will frequently be judged forgivable by the manufacturer. They may even be 
deliberate features, as in the DVD region code case. Conversely, some instances of culpable misdesign 
from the manufacturer’s perspective may actually be welcomed by consumers. One thinks of the popular 
myth of the super-long-lasting incandescent light bulb. According to this myth, the technology exists to 
manufacture light bulbs that last thousands of times longer than regular bulbs – but to produce such bulbs 
would kill the light bulb industry, so nobody does! From the perspective of this (mythical) manufacturer, 
bulbs that last too long evidence culpable misdesign (though no consumer would complain). 
v Stephen Stich (personal communication) provides another imaginary example: “Suppose there were a 
culture… for whom one specific number is regarded as particularly unlucky, the number 88888888. 
Designers of calculators know this.  So they start with an ordinary calculator and build in a special small 
program which displays a random number whenever the rest of the calculator says that the answer is 
88888888.  They advertise this as a special selling point of their calculator.  When the answer is really ‘that 
horrible unlucky number’ the calculator will tell you it is something else.  It will lie to you. Sales of the 
‘lucky calculator’ get a big boost.” 
vi Note that narrow-or-broad construals of function are also possible with respect to artifacts. To cite an 
example analogous to the immune system case, an electric sabre saw will cut right through its own power 
cord if the operator lets it. Is this a malfunction? The saw is designed to saw through whatever is put in its 
way, and so it does! The difference is that we can consult the designer for his/her intentions where artifacts 
are concerned. Most likely the designer will say “of course the sabre saw hasn't 'malfunctioned' – no artifact 
need be idiot-proof!” But we can still solicit the information, whereas that option is closed to us for evolved 
systems. See Section 10 for a related point. 
vii Fodor (2007) has vigorously challenged not just Millikan’s claim, but the family of related claims made 
by evolutionary theorists. According to Fodor, the historical facts of evolution, even if we knew them, 
could not distinguish function from merely accompanying by-product.  Fodor’s position has been just as 
vigorously rebutted (see e.g. Coyne & Kitcher, 2007; Dennett, 1990b, 2007a, 2008). It is perhaps worth 
noting that an implication of Fodor’s position, resolutely endorsed by Fodor, is that biologists are not 
entitled to say that eyes are for seeing, or bird wings for flying - though airplane wings, having intelligent 
human designers, are for flying. 
viii Other animals may have evolved methods of compensating for this distortion. For instance, Casperson 
(1999) suggests that in a certain class of birds that plan underwater foraging from wading or perched 
positions above the water, a characteristic vertical bobbing motion of the head may allow them to 
compensate for refraction: “…the refraction angles change as a bird moves its head vertically, and with 
suitable interpretation these angular variations can yield unambiguous information about water-surface and 
prey locations” (p. 45). See also Katzir and Howland (2003), Katzir and Intrator (1987), and Lotem, 
Schechtman and Katzir (1991). 
ix Nevertheless, evolved cognitive systems are remarkably supple, as researchers in Artificial Intelligence 
are forever discovering. Among the holy grails of AI are systems that are “robust” under perturbation and 
assault, and that will at least “degrade gracefully” - like so many naturally evolved systems - instead of 
producing fatal nonsense when the going gets tough. 
x In some cases these “other parties” may potentially be our close kin. This is not to suggest, however, that 
misbeliefs evolve via kin selection (Hamilton, 1964). Voland and Voland (1995) have suggested that the 
human “conscience” is an extended phenotype (Dawkins, 1982) of parental genes that evolved in the 
context of parent/offspring conflict (Trivers, 1974) over altruistic tendencies. In a particular “tax scenario” 
of this conflict (Voland, 2008; see also Simon, 1990), it may be adaptive for parents to raise some of their 
offspring to be martyrs (perhaps by instilling in them certain beliefs about the heavenly rewards that await 
martyrs). In this scenario the martyrdom of the offspring increases the inclusive fitness of the parents 
(perhaps via a boost in the social status of the family). The martyrs themselves, however, are evolutionary 
losers – hapless victims of the generally adaptive rule of thumb “believe, without question, whatever your 
grown-ups tell you” (Dawkins, 2006a, p. 174; see again Simon, 1990). 
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xi The breakage itself would be normatively normal (Normal) yet statistically abnormal. But what about the 
belief system as a whole? Surely it would cease its Normal functioning when a doxastic shear pin broke? 
Here we return to the overlaps encountered in section 5, and may again invoke Millikan (1993) for an 
alternative construal: Perhaps the belief system would be made to labour (Normally?) under external 
conditions not Normal for performance of its proper function. 
xii The claim that mentally healthy individuals hold unrealistically positive beliefs is related to – but 
logically distinct from – the contested claim that depressed individuals exhibit accurate perceptions and 
beliefs (a phenomenon known as “depressive realism”; see Alloy & Abramson, 1988; Colvin & Block, 
1994). 
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